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After weeks of massive demonstrations, the French government has backed down in the 
face of protests led by French students over changes in national labor law. The proposed 
changes would have allowed employers to fire workers under age 26 without reason, 
notice, or severance. The hope was that by making it easier to dismiss workers, 
employers would hire more workers and youth unemployment would fall. 
 
Of course, these conditions, known as "employment at will," are standard for workers of 
all ages in the United States. Perhaps because we take these employment conditions for 
granted in the United States, the response in the U.S. media has been scathing. The New 
York Times Editorial Board has pronounced, for example, that French youth 
unemployment is “catastrophic” and that the “real threat” of the demonstrations is that 
the French government “may be dissuaded from attempting the broader social and 
economic reforms that France requires, both for its own future and for the future of the 
European Union.”  
 
A media consensus has emerged that French youth are stupendously misguided - they 
have no idea what their own interests are; they have an outdated, childlike dependence on 
the state for protection from the real world of market forces; and they are often simply 
lazy and prefer the dole to work. As for French unions, U.S. critics charge that they are 
merely being opportunistic – trying desperately to stem their descent into irrelevance. 
 
On closer examination, though, maybe there is something to the popular opposition. 
Large majorities of France opposed the change. Can such a large, highly educated 
population be so wrong? We suggest that there are three main reasons for American 
media pundits – and professional economists – to think twice before pronouncing on the 
ignorance, dependence, laziness, and opportunism of French workers.  
 
The first is that the French public probably has a much better grasp of the extent of the 
youth unemployment problem than is captured in official unemployment statistics. 
Because large shares of youth are enrolled in school and not employed, the 
unemployment-to-population measure is a better measure of the magnitude of the 
unemployment problem than the standard unemployment-to-labor force measure. Second, 
for youth, a larger employment rate should not be the sole criterion of a well-functioning 
labor market and social system, especially for 16-19 year olds. And third, the available 
economic evidence on the effects of employment protection regulations combined with 
the available of temporary (fixed contract) jobs for youth, strongly suggests that that the 
proposed change would have little or no effect on either employment opportunities or the 
unemployment rate for youth. We address each of these points in turn. 
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1. How Catastrophic is French Youth Unemployment? 
 
There is no doubt that the official youth unemployment rate in France is very high. At 22 
percent, it was substantially above the U.S. rate of 11 percent (and even further above the 
U.K. rate of 9.9 percent and the Dutch rate of 8.1 percent).
1 But this “catastrophic” 
French rate reflects the technical definition of unemployment, which is more appropriate 
for prime-age workers than it is for youth.  
   
The official unemployment rate measures the unemployed (those willing and able to 
work and currently searching for a job) as a share of the labor force -- the unemployed 
and the employed. This definition means that, in two countries with the same number of 
youth and the same number of unemployed youth, the unemployment rate can be hugely 
different, depending on how many of the young people are employed.
2 On this score, the 
difference between the U.S. and France is huge: Row 3 of the table shows that in 2004 
only 32.8 percent of French male 15-24 year olds were employed (at least one hour in the 
survey reference week), compared to 61.9 percent of young U.S. men.  
 
 
Key Labor Market Indicators for Male Youth for the U.S. and France, 2004 
 U.S.  France 
1. Unemployment rate (U/U+E)  11.8  20.8 
2. Labor Force Participation Rate (U+E/population)  70.2  41.4 
3. Employment Population Rate (E/population)  61.9  32.8 
4. Unemployment to Population Rate (U/population)  8.3  8.6 
     Source: statistical annex, OECD Employment Outlook 2005 
 
The fact is that the incidence of unemployment in the total youth population is about the 
same in the two countries. As the table shows, for male youth the unemployment-to-
population rate is 8.3 percent in the United States and 8.6 percent in France. The 
unemployment-to-population rate for female youth is lower in both countries: 7.4 percent 
in France and 6.5 percent in the United States.
3 The dramatic difference between France 
and U.S. is not the relatively large numbers of youth who are unemployed in France, but 
the relatively small number of employed French youth, especially students. Using the 
proper yardstick – relative to the youth population - the magnitude of the youth 
unemployment problem in France is almost indistinguishable from the situation in the 
United States.  
 
 
2. What About Youth Employment Rates? 
 
Compared to other developed OECD countries, France has a low youth employment rate. 
Because most youth are enrolled in school – and most would agree that in the current 
world economy more young people enrolled in school and training programs is better 
than less – the welfare effects of higher youth employment rates, however, is not 
straightforward. This is surely the case for 16-19 year old full-time students.   
 In 2003, the vast majority of 15 to 19 year olds in both France (83.8 percent) and the 
United States (82.9 percent) were enrolled in school. But their employment rates were 
strikingly different. In the U.S., 23.1 percent were also working (generally part-time), 
compared to only 1.8 percent of these French teenagers. For those enrolled in school, 
U.S. teenagers had a much higher unemployment-to-population rate (3.5 vs .8); for those 
not enrolled, the unemployment-to-population rate was about the same (2.4 for the U.S. 
and 2.1 for France).
4  
 
The picture is different for 20-24 year olds. A much higher share of young French adults 
are still enrolled in education (51.1 in France compared to 35.0 percent in the United 
States), but the unemployment-to-population rate for those not enrolled is higher in 
France (9.6 vs 5.9).  
 
Which mix of employment and enrollment is preferable? Clearly we would want as many 
15 to 19 year olds as possible to be in school and both countries have succeeded fairly 
well in achieving this goal. Whether U.S. teenagers – and the future quality of the work 
force – are better off with students in low-wage, largely part-time work is not so clear. 
Turning to young adults, France does a much better job of keeping 20 to 24 year olds in 
school. In 2003, while about one-third of French young adults are not in school and hold 
jobs, almost half (48.5 percent) of their U.S. counterparts are employed and not in school. 
Which is better? If French students are taking advantage of their schooling to build skills 
and capacities, their higher enrollment rates are preferable. But if a large share of French 
youth are in school only because they can’t get jobs and are mainly just biding their time, 
as some argue, their higher enrollment rate at least partly just masks inadequate job 
opportunities. 
 
A far better statistic for measuring poor labor market performance and social dysfunction 
is the share of young adults (ages 20-24) who are neither enrolled in school nor 
employed. On this criterion, France and the U.S. perform almost identically: in 2000, the 
share of all young adults not in school and not employed was 14.1% in France and 14.4% 
in the United States. This compares, for example, to 15.4 percent for the U.K. and just 7 
percent for the Netherlands.
5 
 
Analysis of the productivity levels of French and American workers gives some indirect 
support to the belief that high youth enrollment rates and low youth employment rates 
may payoff for France. According to three different sources of hourly labor productivity 
in the early 2000s, French workers are, on average, about anywhere from 6-16 percent 




3. Will Dismantling Employment Protection Laws Increase Youth Employment? 
 
It is widely accepted, particularly among economists, that employment protection 
legislation (EPL) is one of the main reasons for high unemployment, and this helps 
explain high youth unemployment in France, which, it is claimed, is characterized by 
some of the strictest employment protection in Europe.  According to the OECD, France 
is the only rich, developed country that has acted to strengthen EPL in recent years.  In 
the view of its critics, EPL will have the greatest effects on the employment opportunities of “outsiders”, such as youth and women. In fact, the available economic evidence 
provides little support for the view that scaling back EPL will result in declining 
unemployment. 
 
The OECD provides the only reliable measure of EPL for comparisons across countries. 
Their measure combines a score for “regular” employment (the best jobs with the most 
rights), “temporary” employment (short-term, fixed contract jobs), and collective 
dismissals.  
 
For regular employment, France gets a score (2.5) - higher than the score for many 
OECD countries, but about the same or lower than some low unemployment countries 
including Austria (2.4), the Netherlands (3.1), Norway (2.3), and Sweden (2.9). The U.S., 
by comparison, gets a score of 0.2. It should be noted that all four of the countries just 
cited have achieved unemployment rates that are similar to or lower than rates in the 
United States. But with respect to temporary employment, France stands out with a 
higher EPL strictness score than any other developed country.    
 
At the same time, France gets a relatively low (less strict) score (2.1) on collective 
dismissals, which is not only well below “success stories” of the Netherlands (3.0), 
Austria (3.3), Ireland (2.4) and Denmark (3.9), but is also far below the U.K. and the U.S. 
(both at 2.9).   
 
In the end, the OECD gives France one of the highest overall EPL strictness scores 
because they chose (without published explanation) to weight the strictness of temporary 
and regular employment regulations equally (5/12), despite the fact that only 15 percent 
of France’s workers are employed in temporary jobs. And France’s relatively low 
collective dismissal score gets just a 2/12 weight.  
 
The upshot is that, apart from the rules governing temporary employment, France’s 
employment protection laws are not stricter than many other low unemployment 
European countries. The OECD’s weighting scheme produces an overall score that 
certainly oversimplifies and arguably misrepresents the relative strictness of French laws.   
 
In any event, despite numerous studies that have run statistical tests on the EPL-
unemployment relationship, there is little evidence that there is any connection.
7 The  
OECD's own assessment of the empirical impact of EPL on unemployment places no 
blame on EPL for the high unemployment problems facing some European countries 
including France.  According to the OECD's 1999 evaluation of EPL, “The basic finding 
appears robust: overall unemployment is not significantly related to EPL strictness.”
8 The 
OECD's conclusion was reaffirmed in 2006 in what is perhaps the most careful test of its 
kind to date.
9 The OECD finds stronger evidence that EPL may affect youth 




The relatively small effect of EPL on unemployment is not terribly surprising. EPL may 
make employers less willing to hire new workers -- because it might be difficult to 
dismiss them later if demand falls or the workers turn out to be a bad fit -- but, the purpose of EPL is to make it harder for employers to dismiss workers, which helps to 
keep employment rates higher than they otherwise would be in economic downturns. 
 
In sum, the balance of the statistical evidence to date from cross-country analysis of EPL 
and other labor-market institutions is that the strictness of EPL has little or no effect on 
unemployment, with the results for youth are mixed at best. It is also the case that French 
employers have the option of employing youth under temporary, fixed contracts. While 
less than 15 percent of all French workers are so employed, young workers account for 
almost half of all temporary workers (44 percent in 2000), and nearly 35 percent of all 
employed French youth have temporary contracts.
11 These temporary contracts already 
provide employers with substantial employment “flexibility.” 
 
 
 4. Were the French Students Right? 
 
The widely held view, repeatedly parroted in the U.S. media, that French economic 
performance is poor and that French employment performance is catastrophic, flies in the 
face of the evidence. And the conventional wisdom that the French students are wholly 
misguided in their desire to maintain stronger employment protections than prevail in the 
United States is mistaken and offers a striking example of the ability of free market 
ideology to trump the facts.  
 
With substantially higher hourly productivity, the French economy has produced almost 
as much employment growth as the U.S. since President Bush came into office (3.1 vs 
3.5 percent growth between 2000 and 2005).
12 The two countries have almost identical 
shares of young people in unemployment -- the high youth unemployment rates so often 
cited in the media give a distorted view of the situation in France because so few French 
youth enrolled in school are employed. And perhaps most importantly, the shares of 
French and U.S. youth not employed and not enrolled in school – by far the most 
important measure of social dysfunction - are nearly identical. 
 
At the same time, the French have far higher shares of the young adult (20-24) population 
enrolled in school, which on balance must be a good thing. And as American students 
will be the first to appreciate, French students do not enter the labor market with crushing 
debt burdens (school tuition in France is negligible compared to the U.S.). 
 
Even the widespread belief that freeing employers to fire younger workers without cause  
will cause firms to create more jobs and thereby reduce the unemployment rate is not 
well-supported by economic research. French students and young people may well be 
correct that employers would only respond to the legal ability to fire workers under the 
age of 26 simply by substituting younger for older workers, and then by firing them when 
they approach age 26.  The result would perhaps be some more precarious jobs, but 
probably no more jobs overall, and almost certainly no change in the overall 
unemployment rate. 
 
We do not underestimate the inadequacy of job opportunities facing French youth. But 
the withering attack on the French and their welfare state in recent weeks reflects both a 
greatly exaggerated view of the real magnitude of youth unemployment levels and a wildly exaggerated belief in the effects of employment protection regulations on 
unemployment.  
 
At the same time, the proposal, and the harsh criticism of those who dared question its net 
payoffs, reflects a narrow free market fundamentalism in which serious economic 
evidence of the beneficent effects of deregulation becomes entirely unnecessary. Who has 
seen such evidence cited in the scores of commentaries on this issue? Perhaps the French 
students sensed that free market ideology had trumped the evidence. At least in this 
regard, the French students were right after all. 
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